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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the main economic issues surrounding liability for genetically modified 
organisms, with focus on the New Zealand situation and liability debate, and in particular the 
interaction between liability and regulation. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) potentially offers important benefits for New 
Zealand, but may also pose significant risks.  The nature of GMOs are such that many of the 
costs of accidents will fall on third parties that have no contractual relationship with the 
GMO user, and so GMOs can be considered to produce negative externalities.  It is a standard 
result in economics that market outcomes are inefficient in the presence of externalities when 
agents cannot costlessly negotiate, and that this can be solved by shifting external costs and 
benefits to the party making the decisions.  This then provides that party with the appropriate 
incentives to make efficient decisions.  A liability regime is one means of trying to internalise 
these externalities by shifting the external costs of using GMOs onto GM firms. 
 
This paper examines the main economic issues to be considered when designing a private 
liability regime.  The challenge in designing an efficient private liability regime is to create a 
legal framework that provides incentives for private parties to take socially desirable actions.  
Thus, the prime consideration in evaluating different elements of such a regime is the 
incentives these elements will create.  An efficient liability regime will provide incentives for 
parties to take an efficient level of precaution, and to run only socially desirable projects. 
 
2.0 The potential for harm 
                                                 
1 This paper is drawn from material covered in detail in Hutton (2003).  Many of the arguments discussed in 
brief here are analysed in formal economic models in this thesis, as is a broader review of the economic theory 
of liability. 
In order to analyse liability regimes, it is necessary to first have a clear outline of the nature 
of possible accidents that GMOs might cause.  It is important to understand that this is a 
statement about potential harm, not a statement that GMOs will necessarily turn out to cause 
these types of accidents. 
 
The level of risk posed by GMOs is highly controversial.  The Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification (Eichelbaum 2001) contains comments from a range of respected scientists, and 
represents the most complete set of views available.  The Commission’s recommendation to 
“proceed with caution” is based on a belief that the benefits of GMOs outweigh the risks, 
when these are properly managed – but not a belief that the risks posed by GMOs are non-
existent. 
 
Four types of harm might be inflicted by GMOs. 
 
2.1 Personal injury 
The first type of accident risk is the potential for personal injury or damage to human health.  
This may occur from exposure to or consumption of GMOs, such as if genetically modified 
foods or pollens prove toxic or trigger allergies (which can range from mild to potentially 
fatal). 
 
The Royal Commission also noted submissions about the possibility of personal injury from 
medicines designed using genetic modification technology.  While such medicines may pose 
risks, they must go through the rigorous testing that all new pharmaceuticals pass through.  
There appears to be no evidence that pharmaceuticals designed through GM technology are 
more likely to be more dangerous than those developed using other techniques, so the 
existing requirements is likely to be sufficient.  Another concern is harm from dietary 
supplements, where controls are less rigorous (Eichelbaum 2001, p60). 
 
There is also the possibility that new diseases could be created through use of genetic 
modification.  As the Commission notes: 
 
“The major perceived risk arising from the use of DNA from other microorganisms as transgenic vectors 
is the possibility of the generation of new diseases through recombination of the vector sequences with 
DNA from known pathogens.” (Eichelbaum 2001, p46 para 13) 
 
However, this could only occur from experiments in controlled laboratory environments, and 
so the risk of damage from such diseases is minimal if proper laboratory safety precautions 
are taken.  This risk would be similar to that posed by existing experiments using pathogens, 
with the exception that escape of a disease created through GM may be more serious in that 
humans will not have encountered the particular disease and so may have no existing 
antibodies. 
 
2.2 Property damage and economic loss 
The second type of damage that could occur is property damage or economic loss to parties 
as a result of GMO release, such as through contamination of a non-GM crop by GMOs.  In 
particular, economic loss may occur from loss of organic certification by a farmer due to 
GMO contamination, and so loss of the price premium they are able to charge for organic 
products.  The circumstances under which certification loss occurs will depend on the 
specific requirements for organic certification that growers face.  If such certification has 
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very little tolerance for contamination, then this form of economic loss will be much more 
common than if certification levels allow more tolerance. 
 
It seems likely that organic certification requirements for New Zealand growers will be 
influenced by international organics standards, such as those created by the International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, as organic production will be primarily aimed 
at export markets.  International standards will be determined by major organics producers 
overseas, and are unlikely to be affected by the New Zealand liability regime.  Such 
international standards reject GM crops of any sort as being organic, but tolerance levels will 
have to be set at a level that growers in other countries are able to meet, and so may not 
include zero tolerance for contamination, as this may be unrealistic in countries where there 
has already been release of GMOs, or where release has occurred nearby. 
 
Use of GMO crops could also reduce returns to conventional farmers (for example, by GMO 
farmers being able to undercut prices due to cheaper production methods), but this would 
serve as a desirable market-based signal to farmers that more efficient technology was 
available.  No liability regime will (or should) compensate for such effects: they do not cause 
inefficiencies. 
 
2.3 Environmental damage 
A major concern for many is the potential for widespread environmental damage from the 
introduction of GMOs, such as loss of biodiversity.  There is fear that genetically modified 
crops (or weeds that cross-pollinate with such crops) or animals (such as fish) may be 
stronger than natural varieties and so may choke out native species, either through out-
competing them for space, food or habitat or by hybridisation.  There are also concerns about 
potential impacts on non-target species. 
 
In some cases it may be hard to demonstrate to a court that appreciable harm has occurred.  It 
may be difficult to prove that damage occurred from a particular GMO, and to trace that 
damage to a particular injurer if there are multiple parties using the GMO.  As the damage is 
likely to be widespread, there would be very little incentive for individuals to mount tort 
actions for environmental damage, leaving such action up to government discretion.  These 
problems limit the effectiveness of any tort liability regime, whether under strict liability or a 
negligence rule. 
 
There is also the unlikely possibility of catastrophic or irreversible damages from GMOs in 
some manner that is currently unforeseen.  The potential for irreversible damage from GMOs 
is more than from some other new technologies and hazardous activities because biological 
organisms are able to reproduce themselves in the wild, whereas the effects of other activities 
such as chemicals or even radiation will fall over time. 
 
2.4 Spiritual pollution 
A final form of potential costs and damage from GMOs comprises the “ethical costs” of 
GMOs and what has been termed their “spiritual pollution” (such as concerns expressed to 
the Royal Commission by religious groups and many Maori).  These are real social costs 
because there are clearly some groups who put some value on these issues.  However, such 
costs are very difficult to quantify.  It is difficult to envision how any liability regime could 
deal with such damages.  It would be difficult for a particular party to establish to a court’s 
satisfaction that a GMO had harmed that party or that the harm was of a particular 
quantifiable amount, let alone that a particular injurer was responsible for the harm and 
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should be held liable.  Researchers or users may also have little information on what these 
costs are or how to alleviate them, and so providing incentives for precaution to reduce the 
risk of spiritual harm may be difficult, and such incentives may be of limited effectiveness. 
 
As private liability is not likely to deal with spiritual concerns, the only solution may for 
ERMA to consider these issues in assessing whether an application gains consent.  This will 
encourage applicants to consider spiritual issues so as to increase the probability that their 
application will be accepted.  ERMA is currently required to consider ethical concerns 
(ERMA, 2000) and Maori concerns about “the relationship of Maori and their culture and 
traditions with their ancestral land, water, sites, waahi tapu, valued flora and fauna and other 
taonga.” (ERMA 1998, p.10) in its application process, so it may be that no changes are 
required here.  Nahkies et al (2003) find that many of these groups do not feel that their views 
are considered, particularly for non-Maori with ethical concerns about genetic modification. 
 
It is clear that tort liability systems are better suited to handle personal injury, property 
damage and other economic losses rather than environmental damage, because errors in 
measuring damages are high in the latter case and these damages are spread over a large 
number of victims, and so there is little incentive for individual victims to initiate lawsuits.  
Such lawsuits will only occur for widespread environmental damage when class-action suits 
occur, or where government initiates civil suits against injurers.  However, the standard 
theory of liability (which considers accidents that harm a single victim) is useful for 
examining liability policy for personal injury, property damage and economic loss. 
 
There has been little discussion of alternative non-tort-based liability regimes to cover these 
other damages.  There needs to be more such discussion and consideration of whether such 
costs will either be left to lie where they fall, be dealt with by ex-post government 
compensation related to individual crises or whether some formal government compensation 
scheme (like ACC) should be designed.  Since environmental damage is by nature fairly 
widespread, it is likely that such damage will fall be left to lie where it falls by default. 
 
3.0 Comparisons with other activities 
If there is a successful liability regime in place for dangerous activities similar to GMOs, then 
we could adopt that liability regime without performing a separate analysis for GMOs.  If no 
such clearly successful regime exists, then we need to undertake a separate analysis of 
liability for GMOs. 
 
3.1 Comparable activities 
There have been a number of comparisons made between GMOs and different classes of 
activities.  The closest comparison is between organisms created through genetic 
modification techniques and those created through other methods, from controlled pollination 
and hybridisation to mutagenesis and cloning (which are specifically excluded from the 
definition of GMOs in legislation). 
 
Many of the same risks apply to these other crops: if a herbicide-resistant crop is created 
through some other technique, then it has equal chances of cross-pollinating with weeds and 
causing environmental damage as one created by genetic modification.   
 
Because these are outside the definition of genetic modification, their liability status will not 
be affected by any changes in the liability regime for GMOs.  Thus, adopting a new regime 
for GMOs would create a legal inconsistency. 
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Attention has been drawn to other hazardous activities, particularly nuclear power, 
chemical/toxic waste and asbestos. 
 
Nuclear power involves risks of very high potential damage that may have very long-lasting 
adverse effects (despite not being irreversible in the strict sense of the word, as radioactive 
materials will eventually decay).  There are clear and highly effective precautions that can be 
invested in by injurers in the design of plants (such as containment structures and redundant 
safety and plant shutdown systems) and in security/safety personnel and equipment, while 
there are few precautions that victims can take other than from not locating themselves near a 
nuclear plant.  The catastrophic nature of serious nuclear accidents suggests that any major 
accident would bankrupt the plant owner, and so they may be “judgement-proof”, since the 
courts will not be able to make them pay the full cost of an accident.  Liability insurance for 
such damage can also be very expensive, because of the risk of moral hazard (very technical 
precautions are difficult and expensive to monitor) leading to inadequate precaution, and 
because of the ambiguous probability of accidents.  These suggest that a negligence regime 
may be better than strict liability for nuclear power. 
  
Nuclear power has been governed under a range of liability regimes, but there have been 
many suggestions that regime design was heavily influenced by political economy rather than 
optimality considerations, and did not lead to efficient outcomes (Brown, 1999).  While there 
have been relatively few accidents and no major disasters at nuclear plants in countries with 
western tort liability systems, this does not necessarily indicate that these regimes have been 
successful, as the probability of an accident occurring may have been higher than it would 
have been with efficient precautions. 
 
Another activity compared to GMOs is the liability system for contamination by toxic waste 
or chemicals.  As with GMOs, the harm inflicted may not show up for many years after an 
“accident” occurs, and so the injurer might not exist as a legal entity by the time damage is 
discovered.  There is also a significant judgement-proof problem, since damages awarded to 
victims after major accidents often leads to injurer bankruptcy.  This has led to the creation of 
“Superfund” in the USA, a fund designed to pay for cleanup of contaminated sites, funded 
through compulsory levies on industry members.  This has had mixed success, and has been 
criticised because it provides poor incentives for individual firms to change their behaviour, 
and because a large proportion of the fund has been spent on administrative and legal costs, 
rather than pollution cleanup or compensation.  Toxic waste accidents commonly affect large 
numbers of people who individually have little incentive or ability to sue (because of legal 
costs, which are often very high as lawsuits can take many years).  As class action suits are 
rare, there is a perception that the probability of injurers being sued and found liable are low, 
and so a belief that there are insufficient incentives for injurer precaution.  Many states in the 
USA have adopted strict liability regimes for toxic spills, and Alberini & Austin (1999) find 
that those states that have adopted strict liability tend to be those where more accidents have 
occurred, but that imposing strict liability does reduce accident rates. 
 
A third activity that has been compared to GMOs is that of asbestos.  Viscusi (1996) argues 
that liability has been a poor solution for asbestos.  He suggests that liability had little impact 
on precautions, because the extent of harm (and of liability) was unknown when harm 
occurred, and so firms had little incentive for precaution when precaution decisions were 
made.  He also suggests that compensation was poor, because mass tort cases lead to damage 
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claims exceeding the assets of injurers, and litigation costs were almost triple the actual 
compensation received by victims. 
 
Thus, these similar activities do not give uncontroversial precedents (successful or 
unsuccessful) on which to base a liability regime for GMOs. 
 
3.2 Treating like-with-like 
Generally speaking, law should be consistent - activities with similar levels of risk should be 
equally under the law (Law Commission, 2002).  If similar activities are treated differently, 
this may be perceived as unjust, and may distort investment decisions towards equally risky 
but non-GMO technology.  Thus, it is argued that GMOs should not have a separate liability 
regime, and should be treated in the same way as existing activities. 
 
While this is a good argument, there is a strong alternative view; if the current liability 
regime is not optimal for activities with certain risk characteristics (high ambiguity, potential 
for irreversible, widespread or catastrophic damage, etc.) because of incomplete 
internalisation of negative externalities, then the fact that such a regime is the status quo does 
not justify continuing to apply non-optimal policy to new activities.  For example, there are 
many markets where externalities are currently not internalised (such as carbon dioxide 
emissions), but this does not justify a decision not to internalise externalities for future 
markets.  Because of this, the “like with like” argument does not necessarily mean that 
GMOs must be treated the same way as similar risky activities under the status quo. 
 
Ideally, we should treat activities and technologies by the properties of the final product 
(including its risk profile) rather than the method of creation.  While this is a desirable goal, it 
may be infeasible to so if there are no clearly identifiable (and legally verifiable) properties 
by which legislation or regulation can discriminate between products, in which case the 
method of creation may be used as a rough proxy for properties of the product and its the 
level of risk.  In practice there is a tradeoff between the costs of inconsistency and the costs 
of not having a liability regime that best suits a particular activity. 
 
If we do not believe that GMOs are similar to other risky activities, then there is a clear 
justification for evaluating an alternative liability regime.  So what is it that makes GMOs 
different? 
 
First, there are several characteristics of the potential risks that GMOs pose that are not 
shared by most other risky activities, such as the potential for catastrophic and irreversible 
damage, the lack of information about the probability and magnitude of accidents, the 
irreversible nature of some damage, the difficulties in proving causation of harm and the time 
lags between the activity and discovery of damage. 
 
Second, GMO crops may be inherently different from conventional crops, because they have 
the potential to cause economic harm through loss of organic certification from 
contamination.  In other words, they may cause accidents that existing activities cannot. 
 
Third, some argue that GMOs are different because of their spiritual, cultural and ethical 
costs.  While many people do not hold these values, it is clear that there are people who feel 
strongly that genetic modification is inherently wrong - ie for whom GMOs would inflict 
disutility that they would pay to avoid - and so to that extent, these costs are real.  There also 
seems to be a strong public perception that GMOs are different from other forms of science, 
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as demonstrated by many of the 10,000 public submissions to the Royal Commission and the 
nature and existence of the Commission itself.  Whether this is a sufficient justification for 
designing a new liability regime is unclear, as the costs involved are hard to value. 
 
In the absence of a clear answer as to whether or not GMOs are different from other 
activities, and without clear evidence that the liability regimes for other activities are optimal, 
we are justified in conducting a separate analysis to determine the optimal liability regime for 
GMOs, rather than simply adopting an existing regime on the grounds of similarity.  In 
addition, this analysis may also be useful for considering liability issues for other hazardous 
activities. 
 
4.0 Designing a liability regime 
An efficient liability regime will provide the incentives for parties to take the efficient level 
of precaution and make efficient activity level decisions.  An economic analysis of liability 
inherently assumes that people and firms are “rational” and so act to maximise their expected 
utility, which is a function of their wealth.  This means that the best way to get parties to take 
precautions is to provide clear incentives for them to do so, particularly financial incentives.  
Efficient outcomes can be achieved by designing these incentives so that utility-maximising 
decisions by economic agents are the same as those that would be made by a theoretical fully-
informed social planner.  The main dispute in the economics of liability lies in what regime is 
likely to achieve this. 
 
4.1 Strict liability vs negligence 
The main division in opinion is over whether strict liability or some form of negligence rule 
will lead to more efficient outcomes. 
 
Under a negligence rule, injurers are liable if and only if they fail to take some particular 
level of precaution, which could either be a specific set of precautions stipulated by a 
regulator or an undefined duty of reasonable care that will be determined by the courts on a 
case-by-case basis.  Negligence rules can promote efficiency if designed correctly by setting 
the required level of precaution equal to the efficient level of precaution.2  This will then 
provide injurers with incentives to take efficient precaution so as to avoid liability.  It will 
also leave victims with incentives to take efficient precaution, as they bear residual liability if 
the injurer is non-negligent and so wish to minimise accident and precaution costs.  
Contributory negligence can also exist in conjunction with a negligence rule, though there is 
generally no gain in efficiency from doing so.  Negligence can be problematic if precautions 
are non-observable, as injurers cannot be found negligent for not taking precautions that the 
court cannot observe (or verify). 
 
Under strict liability, injurers are liable for damages (generally set equal to the level of harm 
caused by accidents) if an accident occurs, except in cases of particularly defined defences 
(such as natural disasters or deliberate sabotage by a third party).  This liability applies even 
if the injurer took all reasonable precautions to prevent an accident from occurring.  Strict 
liability can lead to efficient precaution decisions if precaution is unilateral, as it internalises 
externalities by placing the costs of accidents on the sole party who can reduce risks.  Strict 
liability may also be efficient in cases of bilateral precaution when there exists a defence of 
                                                 
2 The standard way of determining whether an injurer is negligent is known as the “Hand Rule” after Judge 
Learned Hand.  Effectively, it results in the injurer being found negligent if their precaution level was less than 
the efficient level. 
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contributory negligence, where the injurer is strictly liable unless the victim fails to take a 
stipulated level of protection, as this also provides incentives for victims to take precaution in 
order to avoid liability.  Strict liability is valuable since it provides incentives for injurers to 
take non-observable precautions, because injurers receive the benefits from taking such 
precaution in lower expected accident costs. 
 
In both cases, it must be proved both that damage occurred, and that that the damage was 
caused by the activity of a particular injurer in order for that injurer to be liable. 
 
The current liability regime for GMOs can roughly be described as providing strict liability 
for significant, foreseeable harm to land from dangerous activities, but a negligence rule for 
foreseeable harm to other property or economic loss (Todd, 2000).  This may not be optimal. 
 
4.2 Nature of precautions 
In order to know what incentives are required to attain the efficient level of precaution, it is 
important to have an accurate characterisation of the precautions parties can take to reduce 
the level of harm.  Different beliefs about the nature of precaution will lead to different 
beliefs about the optimal liability regime.  Despite its fundamental importance, there has been 
little attention in the debate thus far paid to the nature of precautions. 
 
There are many questions that need to be answered to form an accurate picture.  First, are 
there any precautions that can be taken, and will these be effective in reducing risk?  If 
precautions are ineffective in reducing the risk of accidents, then providing incentives for 
precautions is relatively unimportant, and pursuing equity goals (such as providing 
compensation) might be a more important goal of a liability regime.  In contrast, if 
precautions are highly effective then it is very important to provide the correct incentives for 
parties to take precautions, and compensation will be less important. 
 
Second, who can take these precautions?  If only one party can take precaution (“unilateral 
precaution”), then liability should be allocated to that party, whereas if both injurers and 
victims can take precautions (“bilateral precaution”), then negligence or contributory 
negligence rules need to be used to achieve an efficient outcome, otherwise one or other party 
will have little incentive to take precautions. 
 
To what extent can regulators and courts and observe these precautions?  If precautions are 
non-observable, then a negligence regime or contributory negligence rule (where the level of 
precaution a party takes is examined by the court to determine their liability) will not be 
feasible, as there will be no way to verify whether the negligence rule was broken or not. 
 
Can precautions be taken only during field trials/commercial release, after regulatory 
approval is granted, or are there also precautions that can be taken in the research or project 
selection processes?  In the former case, firms will have little incentive to take precautions 
without some form of liability.  The latter precautions, if observable, may factor into the 
regulatory approval decision - and so firms may face incentives to take such precautions so as 
to increase the likelihood of gaining approval even if they do not bear liability for damages.  
If they are not observable (or only some are observable), then there could be a moral hazard 
problem, where firms will not take enough of such precautions because the regulator would 
not take them into account (since it cannot observe them), and so the regulator will rationally 
refuse to approve some projects that could be desirable because it knows that firms will not 
take sufficient precaution. 
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Are different types of precaution needed to reduce the risks from different types of accident?  
For example, do precautions used to reduce the risk of property damage also reduce the risk 
of environmental harm?  If so, then the ineffectiveness of tort liability against environmental 
damage may be less important, as providing incentives to reduce the risk of property damage 
will also reduce the risk of environmental damage, though not to an efficient level. 
 
Answers to these questions, and so too the optimal liability regime, depend fundamentally on 
empirical questions. 
 
A number of precautions are possible for reducing the risks of GMOs, and most of these are 
undertaken by injurers.  For any type of GMO, resources spent on laboratory research and 
medical or field trials will provide information to researchers and reduce the chance that an 
organism will have undesirable consequences.  For genetically modified plants, many of the 
potential accidents result from hybridisation of GMOs with non-GMO plants.  These risks 
can be reduced by biological barriers, which reduce the chance of cross-fertilisation between 
species by preventing fertilisation, temporal barriers, which design GMOs to flower at 
different times of year from surrounding crops, and spatial barriers, which separate GMO 
crops from other plants with a common pollinator (Cohen, 2000).  Maintaining distances 
between GMO and non-GMO crops also reduces the risk of contamination.  Finally, victims 
can take some precautions by monitoring, and so noticing any contamination early, before 
serious harm is inflicted. 
 
The efficient precaution level depends on the cost of precautions and their effectiveness in 
reducing accident costs.  The total cost of undertaking a GMO project includes both the costs 
of precautions and the cost of accidents, so the efficient precaution level is that which 
minimises the sum of precaution and expected accident costs.  This occurs when the marginal 
cost of taking an extra unit of precaution is equal to the marginal benefit from the reduction 
in expected accident costs due to the extra precaution. 
 
4.3 Incentives for precaution 
The existing economic literature on liability contains a number of important conclusions 
about the affects of strict liability and negligence on incentives for precaution decisions.  The 
conclusions depend on the answers to the empirical questions discussed above.  Under a 
particular set of assumptions3, it can be shown that both negligence and strict liability (with a 
contributory negligence defence if precaution is bilateral) will provide incentives for injurers 
and victims to take choose efficient precaution levels. 
 
Without liability, injurers would choose to take no precaution, because they do not bear the 
cost of accidents.  If injurers do bear some accident costs, then they will still choose to take 
some precautions, but this will be less than the efficient level.  Thus, some form of liability is 
needed to shift accident costs onto injurers in order to give them incentives to take sufficient 
precaution. 
 
Under strict liability, injurers are liable for accident damages, and so choose a level of 
precaution that minimises the sum of precaution costs and expected accident costs – which is 
                                                 
All accident damage falls on victims, all parties are risk neutral, there are no legal or administrative costs, liable 
parties are liable for damages equal to the amount of harm caused by accidents, all such liability claims will be 
paid in full (ie no bankruptcy risk), all victims will file lawsuits, these suits are costless and there is no 
uncertainty in the outcome of cases. 
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the efficient level.  If victims can also take precautions, then the outcome will be efficient 
only with a contributory negligence rule, which will provide incentives for victims to take 
efficient precaution so as to avoid liability. 
 
Under negligence, injurers are liable for accident damages only if negligent, and so will 
choose to take the efficient precaution level in order to avoid having to pay accident costs.  
Negligence is still efficient if there are bilateral precautions, because victims will bear 
residual liability and so act to minimise their precaution and accident costs, which means they 
will take the efficient level of victim precaution. 
 
Note however that though both systems can lead to efficient precaution decisions, the 
outcome is not the same: injurers bear accident costs under strict liability, while victims bear 
these costs under negligence.  This provides an explanation for why biotech companies 
favour negligence, and environmental groups and organic farmers favour strict liability: 
people prefer the policy system that favours them.  This also has an important impact on 
which investment projects GMO firms will wish to run. 
 
Additional complications can mean that strict liability and negligence need not both lead to 
efficient outcomes. 
 
4.4 Project selection 
While precaution is the main focus of the economics of liability, the efficient outcome may 
depend not only on the level of precautions taken, but also on the level of activity – on how 
many and which GMO projects occur.  This has not been considered in the New Zealand 
GMO liability debate so far.  An ideal liability system would provide incentives so that all 
socially desirable projects run, but only socially desirable projects run, where a project is 
defined to be socially desirable when its social benefits exceed its social costs.  In other 
words, an ideal liability system would have both efficient precaution levels and efficient 
activity levels. 
 
Firms wish to undertake investment projects when they are profitable.  This means that a firm 
will wish to undertake a GMO project when the private benefits exceed the private costs.  
Most of the benefits of a GMO project flow to the firm that undertakes the project through 
profits.  Since injurers do not bear accident costs under negligence, and never bear victim 
precaution costs, there will be some projects that are profitable but are not socially desirable, 
and this problem will be worse under negligence, where injurers do not bear accident costs.  
This provides a strong argument for strict liability unless there is some mechanism that can 
prevent injurers from undertaking socially undesirable projects. 
 
4.5 Project selection and regulation4
One candidate for such a mechanism is regulation.  GMOs in New Zealand are subject to a 
unique regulatory regime, under which firms must apply to the Environmental Risk 
Management Authority (ERMA) for permission to release a GMO.  ERMA is required to 
take all costs, risks and benefits into account when deciding whether to grant approval, and so 
will refuse to allow a project to proceed if it is perceived to be socially undesirable. 
 
If ERMA had perfect information, then it would be able refuse permission for all socially 
undesirable projects, and allow all socially desirable projects through.  Under these 
                                                 
4 The formal economic models that this section is drawn from are detailed in Hutton (2004). 
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circumstances, injurers and victims would both have efficient incentives for precaution 
because of liability, and project selection would be efficient, so both strict liability and 
negligence would be equivalent and efficient.  Unfortunately, a variety of complications 
mean that this equivalence result will not generally hold in practice. 
 
4.5.1 Asymmetric information 
First, note that information is imperfect and may be asymmetric: some parties may have more 
information than others.  Firms planning to invest in a GMO project will undertake market 
research to find out if the project will be profitable and so could have good information, but 
they may not be able to communicate this information to ERMA in a way that is credible, as 
ERMA might not be able to verify it independently, or may not have incentives to accurately 
convey this information.  In such a situation, firms have better information about the benefits 
of a project than the regulator does.  ERMA will still observe some information about the true 
project benefits, and its observation will be positively correlated with the true project 
benefits.  ERMA must use this observed information to decide whether to accept a project or 
not.  As a consequence, ERMA will end up approving some socially undesirable projects or 
will refuse to approve some desirable projects (or both).  This problem will be worse under 
negligence than under strict liability, because there are more socially undesirable projects that 
are profitable for injurers under negligence, where injurers do not bear accident costs if non-
negligent.  In other words, ERMA has a harder time selecting only desirable projects under 
negligence, because there are more applications for undesirable projects. 
 
4.5.2 Sunk research costs 
Second, note that many of the costs involved in a GMO project are irreversible expenditures 
on Research & Development.  Many such costs must be incurred before the project gets to a 
stage where regulatory approval from ERMA is required, and so are “sunk” (ie irreversible) 
by the time that ERMA makes approval decisions.  Because these costs must be paid 
regardless of whether ERMA approves a project or not, a rational regulator will not consider 
these costs when trying to achieve outcomes that are efficient (in a static sense). 
 
The regulator is likely to have poor information about these costs, since it will be difficult for 
a regulator to observe which of a large firms’ costs stem from a particular project without 
having detailed internal accounting information.  Firms could also have the ability to distort 
the observed costs by cross-subsidising activities within the firm, or by not revealing all 
overhead or implicit costs attached to the project in question, and may have incentives to do 
this in order to reduce the apparent costs of the project (and so make regulators more willing 
to approve them).  This means that regulators may not be able to make decisions based on the 
costs even if they wished to do so (in order to maximise welfare in some dynamic sense). 
 
Thus, firms will wish to undertake projects that are profitable, and will invest in and apply for 
all profitable projects that they know regulators will approve.  Regulators who rationally 
ignore (or cannot observe) costs that are sunk by the time an approval decision is considered 
will approve all projects where the social benefits exceed the social costs not yet incurred, 
which exclude the sunk research costs. 
 
This means that there could be some projects that are socially undesirable (total costs exceed 
benefits), that are profitable for firms (benefits exceed private costs), and that regulators will 
allow to proceed (benefits exceed total non-sunk costs).  Knowing that regulators will 
approve them, and anticipating this, firms will invest in these projects, and they will proceed 
– despite being socially undesirable.  This problem will be worse under negligence than 
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under strict liability, since there will be more projects that are socially undesirable but 
profitable for firms, since firms bear fewer costs under negligence than under strict liability. 
 
If firms have the ability to commit to some costs, then they may also have a strategic 
incentive to prepay some of their costs up front before applying for regulatory approval.  
Because these costs are then sunk when the regulator makes their decision, they will be 
ignored, which will make the regulator more likely to approve the project.  This will make the 
problem under negligence worse, since it will increase further the ability of the firm to get 
regulatory approval for profitable but socially undesirable projects. 
 
4.5.3 Imperfect information and sunk costs 
Another problem concerns the incentives a firm faces to invest in research and development.  
Consider the fact that the information a firm has about the risks of a project is often poor until 
a firm undertakes significant R&D.  In other words, firms have imperfect information about 
the risk of a project when deciding whether to commit to undertaking the sunk research costs, 
and only observe the risk of the project once these costs are sunk and the research is 
undertaken.  Once the true risk is observed, then firms will choose to make efficient 
precaution decisions based on these risks because of liability (whether strict or negligence), 
and the regulator will also observe the true risk when making regulatory decisions. 
 
In such a situation, there is no inefficiency in the (fully informed) regulator’s decision, who 
will ignore the sunk costs, but there will be an efficiency problem in firms’ decision to invest: 
firms are too willing to invest in research.  Firms are too willing to invest because they 
choose to invest in projects based on a profit calculation that ignores victim precaution costs.  
Firms will investigate when their expected profit (where profit is benefits less private costs) 
exceeds the research costs, whereas a project is only socially desirable to in when the 
expected social benefits (benefits less all social costs) exceeds the research costs.  Social 
costs exceed private costs because private costs do not include victim precaution costs, and 
under negligence do not include accident costs.  This also means that the problem is worse 
under negligence than under strict liability, because under negligence firms will not consider 
accident costs. 
 
4.6.3 Biased regulation 
Another problem occurs if the regulator has some degree of bias in its analysis of projects.  In 
the case of GMOs, an argument could be made for a bias either way.  ERMA staff who 
undertake analysis of applications are generally ex-researchers, since ERMA must hire 
people who have the necessary technical skills, and so could be overly sympathetic to 
researchers’ perspectives.  On the other hand, ERMA as an institution gains few benefits 
from a successful project but will suffer political fallout from public outcry should an 
accident occur, so may have incentives to be overly conservative in approving projects.   
 
In their review of ERMA’s capabilities, Nahkies et al (2003) suggest that there is a perception 
of pro-applicant bias by some interest groups, particularly those with ethical or spiritual 
concerns about GMOs who feel that their concerns have little impact on decisions.  However, 
they also find that applicants believe that decisions are “heavily weighted towards a 
conservative management and regulation of potential or perceived risk.”  Thus, it is not clear 
in which direction any such bias exists, or its magnitude. 
 
If all parties had perfect information, the effects of a biased regulator would be relatively 
straightforward.  If the regulator is biased against projects, then they will only let very 
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beneficial projects proceed, and these projects will be profitable for firms regardless of the 
liability system.  This means that strict liability and negligence are equivalent if the regulator 
is biased against projects and information is perfect.  If the regulator is biased in favour of 
projects, then they will allow some socially undesirable projects to proceed.  More of these 
projects will be profitable under negligence, and so firms will apply for and receive approval 
for more of these projects under negligence than under strict liability, and so strict liability is 
superior to negligence. 
 
The results are more complicated if we acknowledge that regulators have imperfect 
information, and that applicants generally have better information than regulators.  
Regardless of the direction of bias, a regulator will allow a wider set of projects through 
under strict liability than under negligence.  This occurs because the firm sends an 
informative signal to the regulator (that it thinks a project is profitable) by applying for the 
project.  This signal is a more positive signal of the merits of the project under strict liability 
than under negligence, since projects are more profitable under negligence than under strict 
liability.  Since regulators always prefer projects that are more socially valuable regardless of 
the direction of their bias, their approval requirements will always be more restrictive under 
strict negligence than under strict liability, because they receive better information from 
observing that the firm wishes to undertake the project. 
 
If regulators are biased against projects, then strict liability dominates negligence.  This 
somewhat counterintuitive result occurs because regulators biased against projects will set 
overly restrictive approval requirements, but the restrictions will be more relaxed (and so 
closer to the efficient level) under strict liability than under negligence, because regulators 
know that a project the injurer wants to run is more likely to be socially desirable under strict 
liability than under negligence. 
 
If regulators are biased in favour of projects, then the regulator sets overly lax approval 
requirements.  While the approval requirements will still be larger under strict liability than 
under negligence, it is not clear which policy regime will lead to higher social welfare.  If the 
bias is large enough, then the regulator will accept all projects that applicants will wish to 
apply for, and so strict liability is better than negligence because it causes firms to apply for 
fewer socially undesirable projects.  If the bias is small enough, then strict liability is also 
better than negligence because the welfare gains from injurers applying for fewer socially 
desirable projects outweighs the welfare costs of the bias.  However, for intermediate values 
it is possible that negligence could be better than strict liability, because the regulator accepts 
overly lenient approval requirements, and these are more lenient under strict liability than 
under negligence. 
 
4.6.4 Evidentiary uncertainty 
While strict liability only requires plaintiffs to prove that the defendant caused an accident 
that inflicted harm, negligence also requires proof that the defendant did not take a reasonable 
level of precaution.  While this reasonable level of care should be the efficient level, in 
practice it is often difficult for courts to calculate this level, or to accurately observe the level 
of precaution taken by firms.  This adds a further problem to negligence liability systems, 
since taking the efficient level of precaution no longer guarantees avoidance of liability, so 
firms may not have incentives to take precaution decisions. 
 
The effect of evidentiary uncertainty on precaution levels depends on the size of the 
uncertainty involved.  The larger the level of uncertainty, the smaller is the marginal 
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reduction in the probability of being found liable for any given increase in precaution.  This 
means that if the uncertainty is small enough, firms will choose to take excessive precaution 
in order to increase the probability of avoiding liability.  But if the level of uncertainty is 
large enough, the injurer will under-protect, because the cost of higher expected damages 
from reducing precaution is low relative to the gain from bearing a lower precaution cost.  
However, firms will never choose a precaution level that leads to them bearing higher 
expected total costs than they would bear under strict liability, since they can never do worse 
than being liability with probability one. 
 
This effect on precaution level will also have an impact that projects firms wish to undertake.  
In particular, it could potentially reduce the number of socially undesirable projects that firms 
wish to undertake, and so could increase social welfare relative to negligence with no 
uncertainty.  However, the only projects that firms will choose not to run because of this 
uncertainty will be projects that they would not run under strict liability, so negligence with 
evidentiary uncertainty is still inferior to strict liability. 
 
If victims can also take precautions to reduce accident risk, then strict liability needs a 
contributory negligence defence in order to provide incentives for efficient victim precaution.  
In this case, the problem of evidentiary uncertainty also applies to contributory negligence 
rules under strict liability, so victims may not have incentives to choose efficient precaution 
decisions.  As above, if the uncertainty is small enough then victims will take excessive 
precaution, while if uncertainty is large enough victims will take insufficient precaution.  
While victims do not make project selection decisions, their precaution decisions will effect 
what projects firms wish to undertake: if victims take excessive precaution, then the expected 
cost of accidents is less for firms, so they may wish to undertake more projects than before, 
and to take more or less precaution (depending on whether injurer and victim precaution 
choices are complements or substitutes, ie whether victim precaution makes injurer 
precaution more or less effective, respectively).  The optimal policy in this case is 
ambiguous: it is possible that negligence could be superior to strict liability with contributory 
negligence, or vice versa, depending on the relative levels of uncertainty and the specific 
functional forms of the relative effectiveness of precautions.  It might be the case that the 
better policy is to place the negligence rule on the party whose precaution is less uncertain, 
but this is not certain. 
 
4.6.5 Externalities 
One problem with the arguments above is that they have assumed that GMO projects caused 
no externalities that cannot be internalised through use of liability, and that all benefits from 
GMO projects were appropriated by the firm through profits.  To be more realistic, we should 
consider the possibility of other externalities, both positive and negative.  Possible positive 
externalities include gains to society from knowledge spillovers, tax payments, consumer 
surplus from GMO products or by reduction of existing negative externalities (such as by 
reducing the need for pesticides).  Additional negative externalities include the costs of 
accident types for which liability will not be an effective instrument, particularly for 
widespread environmental damage.  It is unclear which of these factors dominate, and so 
whether net externalities (ie those that we cannot internalise through use of liability) are 
positive or negative. 
 
Suppose that these net externalities are negative.  In this case, strict liability and negligence 
are equivalent and efficient with a perfect regulator (and ignoring any research cost problem), 
since the firm will apply for all socially desirable projects (and some others), while the 
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regulator will be able to reject all socially undesirable projects.  However, if regulation is 
imperfect (or non-existent) then strict liability will dominate negligence because firms apply 
for fewer socially undesirable projects under strict liability. 
 
Now consider the more complex case where net externalities are positive.  First note that if 
these externalities are large enough, then there are socially desirable projects that are 
unprofitable for firms, while if the externalities are small enough then there will be profitable 
projects that are socially undesirable.  This means that the outcome can be inefficient even 
with a perfect regulator because though the regulator can refuse approval for the latter 
projects, it cannot force firms to undertake the former projects.  This inefficiency will be 
worse under strict liability than under negligence, since projects are more profitable under 
negligence, and so there will be fewer unprofitable but socially desirable projects. 
 
Unfortunately, the outcome is ambiguous if there is imperfect (or no) regulation, because in 
these circumstances the regulator can no longer prevent all socially undesirable (but 
profitable) projects from running.  Negligence will tend to be superior if the positive 
externalities are larger, while strict liability will tend to be superior if the positive 
externalities are small (or if there are many projects with high accident risk). 
 
The following table summarises these results.  ( “Imperfect regulation” considers the case of 
regulation in the presence of asymmetric or imperfect information, sunk research costs or 
similar problems, and where ≥ signs indicate weak dominance relationships and = signs 
indicate equivalence). 
 
Optimal liability regime with externalities 
 Positive externalities No externalities Negative externalities 
No regulation NL ≥ SL or NL ≤ SL SL ≥ NL SL ≥ NL 
Perfect regulation NL ≥ SL SL = NL SL = NL 
Imperfect regulation NL ≥ SL or NL ≤ SL SL ≥ NL SL ≥ NL 
 
 
4.6.6 Limited liability and the judgement-proof problem 
A final problem with liability occurs because of the limited liability of companies (and 
individuals).  If a company undertakes an activity that causes an accident, it cannot be forced 
to pay more in damages than the total assets of that company.  In other words, firms are 
“judgement-proof” from accidents whose damage exceeds the assets of the company.  Since 
firms know this, they have insufficient incentive to take precaution against such accidents, 
since they know that they cannot be made to bear all of the costs, regardless of their 
precaution choice.  This problem is much worse under strict liability than negligence, since 
under negligence firms do not bear accident costs if they take sufficient precaution and so the 
judgement-proof problem does not arise. 
 
There are some mechanisms such as compulsory insurance that may mitigate this problem, 
and these are discussed below, but these are likely to provide imperfect solutions.  This 
severity of this problem (and so the strength of the argument in favour of negligence liability) 
depends on the probability of accidents that cause large amounts of damage occurring: the 
lower probability of such accidents, the weaker the argument for negligence. 
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4.6 Problems with tort liability 
There are a number of problems inherent in any tort liability regime.  Some of these favour 
one form of liability over another, while others do not. 
 
4.6.1 Legal costs 
All liability regimes rely on individuals or firms pursuing and continuing lawsuits against 
injurers, but the legal costs involved may deter them from doing so.  This is problematic, 
because if victims do not pursue lawsuits then there is insufficient incentive for injurers to 
take precautions, and so liability regimes will not lead to efficient outcomes.  This underlies 
all tort systems, but may be a bigger problem under a negligence regime than under strict 
liability, where victims have a higher probability of winning any given case and so are more 
likely to undertake such a suit.   
 
However, legal costs can work both ways: high injurer legal costs also provide incentives for 
injurers to take higher (and possibly inefficiently high) levels of precaution in order to reduce 
the probability of accidents.  The impact of legal costs on efficiency thus depends on which 
of these effects dominates.  It is likely that the problem of victim legal costs deterring 
lawsuits is a more important concern, as large defendants may be more able to bear legal 
costs, and may gain reputational advantages from aggressively defending suits and so 
deterring subsequent lawsuits.  This supports the argument for strict liability over negligence 
(to encourage victims to undertake lawsuits), and for punitive damages (so as to increase the 
expected cost from accidents, since this cost will be too low if victims often do not undertake 
lawsuits). 
 
The effect of legal costs will however depend on who actually bears these costs, rather than 
who incurs the costs.  In other words, their effect depends on whether plaintiffs are awarded 
costs in successful suits and defendants in unsuccessful suits.  A successful defendant is 
usually awarded a costs payment, but it seems likely that for many GMO-related suits that 
defendants may have high legal costs while being prosecuted by small farmers or firms who 
may not have sufficient assets to cover these costs, and so defendants may be unlikely to 
actually recover their true costs even if they are awarded costs.  It is less common for 
successful plaintiffs to be awarded costs in addition to damages.  However, even when 
“costs” are awarded, they rarely cover the actual legal costs incurred.  This suggests that legal 
costs are largely borne by the party that incurs them. 
 
It is also possible that legal costs may be less significant than is sometimes suggested, since 
after initial test cases establish precedent, it is likely that many later disputes can be resolved 
by settlement without recourse to expensive legal action.  Large firms and insurers often 
prefer settlements to lawsuits, because they have a smaller negative impact on firm 
reputation, and provide greater certainty than trials. 
 
Legal costs are also real costs to society, and so an efficient liability system should also 
attempt to minimise legal costs, as well as precaution and accident costs.  Legal costs are also 
likely to be lower per case under strict liability than negligence, as plaintiffs have a lower 
burden of proof and so have fewer things to establish.  However, fewer lawsuits will occur 
under negligence, and so it is unclear whether aggregate legal costs are lower under strict 
liability or negligence. 
 
4.6.2 Causation 
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Under any liability regime, accident victims must prove that they suffered harm, and that this 
harm was caused by a particular GMO and a particular injurer.  This difficulty will cause 
victims to undertake too few court cases, and so injurers will take insufficient precaution.  
However, this problem may be solvable through use of punitive damages: if damages are 
greater than the harm inflicted by an accident, this could lead to incentives for efficient 
precaution. 
 
Problems with causation are inherent in all tort liability regimes, whether negligence-based or 
strict liability: all such regimes require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant caused the 
harm they have suffered.  It is also unclear whether the problems of causality are any greater 
for GMOs than for other areas where tort liability is used, such as linking cancer to chemicals 
or smoking.  However, negligence liability entails the additional requirement to prove that a 
duty of care was breached in negligence liability, so it will be more difficult for plaintiffs to 
win cases so they may not undertake enough cases.  Thus, there is an argument for strict 
liability over negligence if punitive damages are infeasible. 
 
4.6.3 Limitations 
Some parties also have concerns about the implications of the Limitation Act 1950 for 
damages from GMOs, as harm may not manifest for a considerable amount of time after an 
accident has occurred.  The Limitations Act normally requires that legal actions be 
commenced not less than 6 years after an accident occurs (or 2 years for personal injury), 
which could rule out claims for damages where harm was not discovered within the 6 years.  
It is possible that under the status quo this time limit will be held to commence from 
discovery of harm rather than at accident date, but this is not clear (Todd 2001, p19).  If this 
discoverability principle is not applicable, then there should clearly be legislation to require it 
– it would be inefficient (and unjust) for claims to not be allowed because of a time limit 
when the harm in question may be inherently latent, because injurers would not have 
incentives to take precautions for accidents that will not manifest until after the period of 
limitations.  Failing to support the discoverability principle would lead to insufficient 
precaution by injurers. 
 
4.7 Who should bear liability? 
Much of the discussion on liability regime design is centred on a highly simplified 
characterisation of the relevant parties involved.  Such discussion generally considers the 
relevant parties to be an “injurer”, generally assumed here to be a GMO firm, and a “victim”, 
such as a farmer whose land is near where a GMO crop is grown. 
  
In practice, the situation is not so simple: a more realistic characterisation would 
acknowledge the existence of both GMO research & development companies (including 
Crown Research Institutes and Universities), who would own the intellectual property right to 
a particular GMO, and also GMO users, such as farmers who plant GMO crops.  There may 
also be manufacturers who produce GMO medicine or seeds under some contract with the 
research company.  These groups face different types of precautionary activities, access 
different information and face different incentives, which may lead to a number of 
principal/agent problems.  In any contractual relationship between these groups, it is likely 
that monitoring will be imperfect and that parties will not be able to contractually specify all 
the actions that the parties will take.   
 
These imperfections must be considered when designing a liability regime.  For example, it 
will not be efficient to hold researchers strictly liable for all accidents if precautions are non-
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contractible and are mostly controlled by farmers: researchers could not force farmers to take 
precautions (and farmers would not have incentives to take precautions if researchers are 
strictly liable), so channelling strict liability to researchers would lead to excessive 
precautions by researchers and insufficient precaution by farmers, while a negligence regime 
for both party might lead to more efficient precaution decisions by both parties.  Given that 
there are likely to be many more farm companies than researchers, transaction and 
administration costs from performance bond or compulsory insurance schemes are likely to 
be higher if placed on users than on researchers.  Researchers are likely to have more 
information about many types of risks than users, while users may have better information 
about other types of risks or potential financial benefits. 
 
For many accidents (particularly those that cause widespread environmental damage) there 
are likely to be large numbers of victims.  It only makes sense to treat victims as a single 
party for environmental accidents to the extent that class action suits are feasible (which can 
involve high transaction costs if many parties are involved) or if government will take civil 
actions.  If such suits are not possible then individual victims will face little incentive to 
undertake suits against injurers, and so injurers may take insufficient precaution. 
 
The effects of multiple injurers and victims will depend on the nature of the liability regime, 
and in particular on how liability is allocated between these parties.  The main question is 
whether liability should be channelled to a particular party or shared between parties, and in 
the latter case on whether liability is joint and several or proportional. 
 
In some situations, it may be desirable for liability to be channelled to the injurer best able to 
bear risk.  This party could then spread the cost of risk to other injurers and consumers 
through contractual relationships (ie through the prices of their outputs and their willingness 
to pay for inputs).  Some injurers will be better able to bear risk than others: they may be less 
risk averse, they may have control over more important precaution decisions, they may be 
able to monitor and enforce the precaution levels of other injurers, they may have better 
access to insurance (such as through lower transaction costs or fewer moral hazard problems), 
they may be well-placed to spread the costs of liability to other parties through contractual 
arrangements or they could have better information than other injurers. 
 
It would be very difficult for legislators to determine which injurer would be best suited to 
bear risk, because such a decision would require detailed information, because the best-suited 
injurer might be different for different projects and activities, and because the risk allocation 
decisions may in turn affect the market structure.  An alternative means of channelling 
liability to the injurer most able to bear risk could be to assign liability to the holder of the 
intellectual property right on the GMO, and then allow injurers use negotiation and contracts 
to allocate the IPR to the party best able to bear risk.  However, this may fail to deliver 
efficient precaution in the presence of limited liability: injurers might allocate liability to the 
party with the least assets (and so most likely to be judgement proof, and so shift risk onto 
victims) rather than the party best placed to bear risk.  Thus, channelling liability to a 
particular party is problematic. 
 
If liability is not channelled to a particular party, then there must be some rule that determines 
how liability is allocated between parties.  One possible rule is “joint and several” liability, 
which can be used in conjunction with either strict or negligence liability regimes. 
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Under strict liability with a joint and several liability rule, each injurer can be held liable for 
the entire damage caused by an accident.  Any party that could take precautions (regardless of 
whether they did take precautions or not) could be found liable for the entire cost of an 
accident if the victim sues them.5  It is likely that victims would tend to sue injurers with the 
most assets (or where causation is easier to prove), and so the highest probability of 
collecting damages.  This suggests that if injurers have different levels of assets, high-asset 
injurers could face excessive incentives for precaution (and may not be willing to undertake 
socially desirable projects) and low-asset injurers could have insufficient incentives for 
precaution, because both know that the high-asset injurer is more likely to be sued if an 
accident occurs. 
 
Under negligence with joint and several liability, individual injurers can be held liable for the 
entire accident costs if they take less precaution than their legal standard of precaution 
(ideally set equal to the efficient level).  Injurers will thus have strong incentives to avoid 
being negligent: by doing so they avoid the possibility of being held liable for the entire 
accident.  There could still be incentives for insufficient precaution, but this is less likely than 
under joint and several and strict liability.  Furthermore, there will be no incentive for 
excessive precaution (except to the extent that there is evidentiary uncertainty surrounding 
precaution levels). 
 
Thus, if liability is joint and several, then negligence will be superior to strict liability (unless 
evidentiary uncertainty is high6) because it will lead to more efficient precaution choices. 
 
The alternative to joint and several liability is “proportional liability”, where each injurer is 
liable for a proportion of the cost of an accident based on the proportion of their contribution 
towards the accident.  Under negligence, injurers would be liable for a proportion of damages 
based on how far their precaution deviated from the efficient level.  This could provide 
efficient incentives for precaution as long there is little evidentiary uncertainty.  The 
interpretation of proportional strict liability is more difficult to determine than the negligence 
case, but injurers would be liable for a proportion of damages related to the proportion of the 
accident they caused.7  This will generally lead to parties choosing more efficient precaution 
levels than under joint and several liability, as the damages each firm faces will be closer to 
the social cost that their actions cause. 
 
Proportional liability could lead to better precaution decisions than joint and several liability, 
but will have higher legal costs, as lawsuits will have multiple defendants and require courts 
to reach judgements about the proportion of liability that each party bears. 
 
An important aspect of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act as it stands is that 
once a particular GMO has been approved for commercial release, any party may release it.  
Initially, release will be determined by the holder of the intellectual property right over a 
particular GMO, who will then presumably license its access to individual users and farmers, 
                                                 
5 Note that once a victim successfully sues a particular injurer and receives compensation, they cannot then sue 
another injurer and so receive more compensation than damage done. 
6 If evidentiary uncertainty is high, then negligence could lead to excessive or insufficient levels of precaution, 
because taking efficient precaution does not guarantee that liability will be avoided. 
7 For example, injurer’s could be liable for a proportion of damages based on what percentage their efficient 
precaution costs are of total injurer precaution costs: if accident damages are 1000, the cost of precaution if all 
injurers took efficient precautions equals 100, and the cost of the efficient precautions by a particular injurer was 
30, then that injurer would be liable for accident costs of 300 if an accident occurs. 
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and such a licensing contract may allow for some monitoring.  Thus, it may be feasible in the 
short-term to make the holder of the intellectual property right liable, as they have some 
control over all releases.  However, in the longer term, intellectual property rights expire, and 
after expiry any company would be able to produce and release a particular GMO.  Thus, the 
long-term consequences of any liability regime need to be considered, such as whether it is 
efficient to make the original researcher liable for any damage from competing producers, 
while noting that it could be difficult to trace damage from a GMO released by multiple 
parties back to a particular injurer. 
 
4.8 Insurance 
Insurance is the practice of allowing risk-averse parties who bear risk to sell that risk to other 
parties.  Accident insurance can have three effects: it decreases the incentive for parties to 
take precautions to reduce risk (moral hazard), but it increases welfare by moving risk away 
from risk-averse parties (or pools that risk), and provides compensation for victims of 
accidents where this would not have happened due to bankruptcy. 
 
4.8.1 Who should bear liability when insurance is available? 
Insurance can generally be purchased either by victims to cover their own losses if an 
accident occurs (“first party” insurance, such as fire insurance), or by injurers to cover 
damages they are liable for (“third party” or “liability” insurance, such as malpractice 
insurance).  Without insurance (and where courts can observe precaution), residual liability 
should generally be placed with the party (injurer or victim) that is less risk averse.  In a 
situation of full and actuarially fair insurance, whether residual liability should be placed on 
injurers or victims depends on whether transaction costs are lower for first party or third party 
insurance.  Since in the context of GMOs it is likely that there will be fewer and larger 
injurers than victims, it is likely that transaction costs would be lower for third party 
insurance, and injurers are likely to be less risk averse than victims.  This would tend to 
favour an argument for liability insurance, and so strict liability.  However, transaction costs 
could be lower for first party insurance, since this avoids courts and legal costs, which would 
favour negligence. 
 
4.8.2 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is a general term describing situations where the creation of a contract may 
provide incentives for one party to take undesirable behaviour.  Moral hazard in insurance 
occurs when insurers are not able to perfectly monitor the precautions taken by insured 
parties, since insured parties then face insufficient incentives to take precautions.  If insurers 
are able to monitor precautionary behaviour8 ex post, then they can stipulate in the insurance 
contract that cover is not provided unless the efficient level of precaution is taken.  Insurers 
would have incentives to do this, since bearing all risk means they wish the efficient level of 
precaution to be taken to minimise this risk.  If insurance contracts have such clauses, there 
will be no moral hazard problem as long as insurers can perfectly observe precaution levels 
ex post.9  However, if monitoring is not possible or is imperfect, then there will still be some 
                                                 
8 Technically, being able to monitor behaviour is not enough – in most cases this behaviour must also be 
contractible.  In other words, behaviour must be able to be clearly measured and defined in contracts, and that 
the observed level can be verified in court: in order for monitoring to be of value, insurers must be able to cancel 
coverage should precaution be insufficient.  In order to do this, they must be able to stipulate what 
circumstances will cancel coverage in the insurance contract, and then verify that the actual precaution met these 
circumstances in court should the insured party challenge the cancellation of coverage. 
9 If injurers may be judgement proof, then ex ante insurer monitoring may be required under some 
circumstances in order to eliminate moral hazard. 
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moral hazard, but social welfare will still generally be higher than if liability insurance was 
banned (Shavell, 1982, 2000). 
 
The magnitude of the moral hazard problem will depend on both the nature of available 
precautions possible and the ability of insurers to observe (and so contract on) precautionary 
behaviour by insured parties. 
 
Some precautions will be relatively easy to observe, such as laboratory procedures, crop 
distances and requirements for clinical and field trials.  Others, particularly technical issues 
such as inclusion of the efficient levels of biological and temporal barriers could be difficult 
to observe, but presumably insurers will hire staff with technical expertise to monitor these to 
some extent.  Note that for a negligence rule to work, we need courts to be able to observe 
precaution, so presumably insurers can also observe precaution. 
 
4.8.3 Uninsurability 
There have been concerns from many parties that insurers may not be willing to offer cover 
for harm from GMOs.  If there is limited cover available, then GM firms will be less willing 
to invest in GM projects (both socially desirable and undesirable) than if they were able to 
insure, and victims are unlikely to receive full payment of large damages awarded to them 
because of limited liability. 
 
There are a number of markets where insurance is unavailable or incomplete, because 
insurance companies are not willing to offer insurance (or equivalently, to offer it at prices 
that firms or individuals are willing to pay).  These markets are generally those where 
insurance performs poorly as a risk management device. 
 
The standard requirements for well functioning and actuarially fair insurance markets are: 
- There should be good information about the probability distribution and magnitude of 
accidents.  
- This information should be symmetric between insured and uninsured parties, so there 
is no adverse selection problem. 
- There should be no moral hazard problem. 
- The maximum level of payout should not be too large. 
- Insurance claims should be independent 
(for example, see Barr 1993) 
 
The major concern about insurance for GMOs is that many of these requirements for efficient 
insurance are not met, and so it is likely that the market for insurance for damages from 
GMOs will be incomplete. 
 
There is currently very little empirical information available about the risks posed by GMOs.  
Some data can be drawn from the historical record of GM crops can be drawn from use in 
North and South America (particularly USA and Brazil), but this is from a relatively short 
period and contains few damages claims.  There are no activities that are clearly similar to 
GM use from an insurance perspective whose claims data could be used instead.  This means 
that the probability of an accident occurring and the likely damages that an insured injurer 
would be liable for are unknown, and expectations of these may be highly inaccurate.  This 
makes actuarial analysis difficult, and so insurers may not be willing to offer insurance 
except at very high premiums. 
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Insurers can be described as being “ambiguity averse” – when they do not know the true 
probability distribution of accident risk, they will charge insured parties a higher premium to 
compensate for this uncertainty. 10 
 
Insurer ambiguity aversion is important for the case of GMOs because insurers do not know 
the probability distribution of GMO accidents.  This means that insurers may not be willing 
to offer actuarially fair insurance even if risk neutral, and if the ambiguity is large enough 
then a market for GMO insurance may not exist. 
 
The problem of incomplete information will be more severe where GMO firms have more 
information about their risk than injurers.  In these cases, there may be an adverse selection 
problem, whereby insurers have to set premiums high enough to cover losses from high-risk 
firms, which tends to drive low-risk firms out of the market.  In other words, actuarially fair 
insurance may not be available for low risk projects if insurers cannot distinguish between 
high risk and low risk projects, but firms can do so.  However, insurers offering insurance for 
GMOs will presumably hire experts in GM risk analysis, so firms might not have much more 
information than insurers about risk. 
 
Moral hazard, as discussed above, will also raise the cost of insurance.  While insurance will 
still be “actuarially fair” given the higher level of risk caused by moral hazard, it will cost 
more than it would in the first-best efficient outcome with no moral hazard. 
 
The size of potential damages from an accident will not necessarily reduce the availability of 
insurance.  The international reinsurance industry is capable of providing cover for very large 
damage claims if the probability of occurrence is well known – though the premiums required 
will be accordingly high. 
 
Some have argued that insurance may not perform well for GMOs because of correlation 
between damages claims, since a single accident may cause harm to multiple victims.  
However, the occurrence of accidents is likely to be uncorrelated: if a GMO crop in one area 
happens to contaminate the crop of a neighbour, then this does not increase the likelihood of 
another crop contaminating another farm11.  Each accident causes harm and damage 
payments to multiple parties, but these could be aggregated and considered as a single 
accident with harm equal to the aggregate harm suffered by all victims.  In many cases 
multiple victims from a single accident may take class action suits against a single injurer, so 
damages claims may also be aggregated in practice.  Thus, the effect of multiple victims is 
simply to increase the effective size of damages – and the size of claims is not necessarily a 
barrier to the availability of insurance.  Larger effective size does however increase the need 
for reinsurance and so the transaction costs involved in providing insurance cover. 
 
On the other hand, an argument can be made that insurers’ expectations of payouts may be 
correlated across policies.  Given imperfect information and ambiguity about the risks posed 
by GMOs, if a particular GMO turns out to cause an accident, that may cause insurers to 
update their beliefs about the risk of GMOs in general (or about the risk of a particular 
                                                 
10 Kunreuther, Hogarth and Mezaros (1993) surveyed actuaries, underwriters and insurers, and found that they 
will add an additional cost above the expected value of losses when there is ambiguity regarding the probability 
or magnitude of payouts. 
11 Arguably there could also be some common element across organisms that effects the likelihood of accidents.  
For example, if particular climate or weather conditions affect the probability of an accident, then accidents will 
be correlated. 
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category of GMO products, e.g. modified soy crops), and so could cause their expectations of 
the risk of other GMO projects to rise.  If this is the case, then if one GMO project causes an 
accident then this increases insurers’ expectation of the probability of having to make payouts 
for accidents from other projects, and so effectively the expected of payout of policies for 
different projects may be correlated.  This would have the same effect on insurance as if 
accidents were actually correlated. 
 
Payouts for damages could also be correlated if legal precedents stimulate further litigation 
and so further payouts (eg a landmark court case in favour of victims stimulates other victims 
to sue for similar cases, as has occurred for tobacco cases in the USA). 
 
Correlation between GMO payouts should only pose a problem for the insurance industry if 
these payouts are also correlated with the performance of capital markets.  If this GMO risk is 
uncorrelated with market performance (as seems likely), then GMO insurance contracts have 
no systematic risk, and in theory insurers could diversify away the effects of non-systematic 
risk as long as the GMO risk is a small enough proportion of global capital markets.  Thus, 
correlation of claims might not present a major problem for GMOs.  In practice insurers are 
often not able to diversify away all effects of non-systematic risk as capital markets are 
imperfect, so correlation may still increase the premiums insurers require to cover GMO 
accidents.  However, even if GMOs were correlated with capital markets, the effect of this 
would merely be to increase the required premiums, which need not imply an efficiency 
problem. 
 
There is some evidence suggesting insurers may be unwilling to offer cover for many GMO-
related activities.  The Law Commission notes informal conversations with the Insurance 
Council of New Zealand, which suggest insurers would be unwilling to offer cover because 
of inadequate information (Law Commission 2002, p29 para 109), and Swiss Re suggests 
that insurance cover may be limited, but there has been limited public comment from the 
insurance industry thus far. 
 
However, the problem of uninsurability may be overstated.  Correlation and accident size are 
not likely to be major problems for global insurance markets, and ambiguity will fall over 
time as more information becomes available about the probability distribution of risks.  Thus, 
uninsurability may be a temporary problem that could slow the growth of GM technology, 
rather than a long-term issue. 
 
Another problem exists for insuring GMOs in that insurance typically only provides cover for 
the period in which the premium is paid.  If companies cease to pay premiums (due to 
bankruptcy or ceasing to use GMOs), then insurance cover will cease even though the 
potential for harm may continue.  One possibility would be for insurance contracts to cover 
harm caused during periods when premiums are paid, regardless of when it is actually 
discovered.  This could be problematic however in that it may not be possible to determine 
exactly when the accident occurred, particularly if considerable time has passed before the 
harm is discovered. 
 
4.9 Bankruptcy and compensation instruments 
As discussed above, a major problem with tort liability systems is that injurers may not be 
able to be held liable for full accident damages, and so injurers make take insufficient 
precautions.  There are two main reasons why this may occur. 
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First, the injurer that undertook the activity that caused an accident may no longer exist as a 
legal entity when the accident damage is discovered (generally due to bankruptcy or winding 
up a venture company).  This could be a particular problem with GMOs because of the 
potential for a long time lag between use and damage.  If injurers know that this may occur, 
then they know there is a positive probability that they will not have to bear liability for 
accidents, and so do not have incentives to take sufficient precaution. 
 
Second, the level of harm done to the victim may exceed the assets of the injurer, and so the 
injurer may go bankrupt because of limited liability rather than pay the full cost of the 
damages, leaving the injurer “judgement-proof”.  In bankruptcy, winners of tort actions have 
financial claims with the same status as other unsecured creditors, and will usually not 
receive the full damages payment they are awarded.  Because of bankruptcy risk, injurers 
know that there is a chance that they will not have to bear the full cost of the risk of their 
actions, and so have incentives to take fewer precautions than is optimal. 
 
The problem of bankruptcy will be particularly important if firms with significant assets are 
able to create subsidiary companies in which hazardous activities (such as GMO release) are 
carried out.  Firms could create such subsidiaries and pay out the profits to the parent 
company, leaving the subsidiary with very few assets.  If a major accident occurs, then the 
subsidiary may be unable to pay the damages and go bankrupt, but the parent company will 
be unharmed, unless the courts are willing to reach through to the parent company to apply 
damages.  Thus, if activities are carried out by small limited liability subsidiaries, then the 
problem of insufficient precaution will be worse, because there will be a higher probability 
that any given accident will cause more damage than the injurer has assets, and so a higher 
probability that the injurer will be judgement-proof.  Alberini & Austin (1999) find some 
evidence that firms respond to imposition of strict liability regimes by reducing their business 
sizes, and so their asset levels. 
 
While firms acting in shareholder interests will still have an incentive to reduce the 
probability of high damage accidents, they do not have an incentive to invest in precautions 
that reduce the magnitude of damage of an accident if that accident would already bankrupt 
the company, as shareholders would bear all of the costs of precaution but achieve no savings 
in the event of an accident. 
 
The problems of bankruptcy are much worse under strict liability than under negligence, 
because injurers must always bear accident costs under strict liability, but will only do so 
under negligence if they are negligent.  Thus, injurers may still take sufficient precaution 
under negligence, because this will allow them to avoid liability.  If strict liability was to be 
adopted, then we may want some mechanism to try and mitigate the judgement-proof 
problem.  A range of such mechanisms are considered below. 
 
4.9.1 Compulsory insurance 
One way of mitigating the judgement-proof problem under strict liability is a regime of 
compulsory insurance.  Such a mechanism was suggested by many submitters to the Royal 
Commission, and is commonly used for many hazardous activities (such as compulsory 3rd 
party auto insurance).  A compulsory insurance regime would require some (or all) liable 
parties to purchase insurance if they wish to release a GMO. 
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The effect of a compulsory insurance regime (under strict liability12) would be to force 
injurers to bear the full cost of the risk their accident imposes.  Insurance premiums would be 
based on the risk of an activity, and so insured parties would still bear the cost (but not the 
uncertainty) of their activities by paying premiums.  These premiums would be paid before 
the activity could cause an accident, and so limited liability would not affect the ability to pay 
premiums.  As discussed in 4.8.2, insurers will generally monitor the behaviour of insurees, 
and will deny coverage if insufficient precaution is taken.  Because of this, injurers would 
face precaution incentives equivalent to those of a negligence regime13: if an injurer took less 
than the efficient level of precaution, the insurer would observe this and so insurance cover 
would be invalidated, while the injurer would have already paid the cost of the premium.  
Thus, injurers would generally choose to take efficient precaution levels. 
 
Compulsory insurance will however add to the costs (both private and social) of the GMO 
industry because of the transaction and administration costs involved in running insurance.  
Without compulsory insurance or the judgement-proof problem, risk-averse firms will choose 
a level of insurance by balancing the transaction costs of insurance against the benefits from 
transferring risk to insurers (which is a social gain).  With the judgement-proof problem, they 
will purchase insufficient insurance.  However, requiring compulsory insurance could force 
firms to purchase excessive insurance, since the gains from that insurance (from shifting risk 
to less risk-averse parties, and from mitigating precaution decision problems caused by 
judgement proofing) might not outweigh the transaction costs of providing insurance for all 
injurers. 
 
The performance of a compulsory insurance regime depends fundamentally on what level of 
insurance cover is available.  If insurance cover is available for most types of projects that 
applicants wish to run, then such a regime may mitigate the problems created by judgement-
proof injurers.  If, on the other hand, insurance cover is highly limited or expensive because 
of uninsurability problems, then a requirement for compulsory insurance will effectively ban 
a wide range of GMO projects. 
 
This poses the question as to whether projects that injurers wish to undertake without 
insurance, but which they will not undertake with compulsory insurance (because of the cost 
of insurance) are necessarily socially undesirable. 
 
There are many reasons why insurance markets might be unwilling to provide insurance for 
socially desirable projects.  For example, there may be a delay in design of financial 
instruments for covering GMO risks, or a lag in information between the GMO industry and 
the insurance industry.  This would lead to a period in which GMO use was effectively 
banned, though this would be temporary.  If GMO damages retain significant ambiguity 
beyond the medium term, then it is possible that insurers may still refuse to insure such 
projects because of ambiguity aversion.  If injurers are less ambiguity averse than insurers (or 
if injurers have better information about risks than insurers and so suffer less from 
ambiguity), then there could be socially desirable projects that insurers would not be willing 
to cover.  Finally, if insurance entails a moral hazard problem, then compulsory insurance 
could raise the costs of insurance such that some injurers would not run some projects that 
                                                 
12 The case for compulsory insurance under negligence is much less convincing.  Under negligence, injurers will 
generally avoid liability by taking sufficient precaution, and so need not purchase liability insurance. 
13 Ignoring the problems of imperfect insurer monitoring, a strict liability regime with compulsory insurance is 
fundamentally very similar to a negligence regime, but where injurers must still bear the cost of accidents risk. 
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would be socially desirable if efficient precaution levels were taken.  In other words, 
compulsory insurance may effectively ban some socially desirable projects. 
 
Since the benefits of compulsory insurance come from reducing the probability of 
bankruptcy, the benefits from introducing compulsory insurance are higher when bankruptcy 
is a serious problem (ie when in there is a high probability that accident damage exceeds 
injurer assets).  Imposing compulsory insurance has two types of costs.  First, it reduces 
welfare because of the transaction costs of insurance (and possibly moral hazard costs) on 
projects that run.  Second, it reduces the profits that injurers receive from projects and so may 
lead to some projects not running that would have been socially desirable without 
compulsory insurance, which reduces welfare.  Given these, compulsory insurance will have 
lowest benefits and highest costs for projects where there is a low probability of large 
accidents, insurance costs are significant (because of transaction costs or moral hazard due to 
unobservable precaution), and private benefits to injurers are low relative to social benefits 
(due to large positive externalities).  Many projects may fit these characteristics. 
 
4.9.2 Capped liability 
Uninsurability problems may limit the range of projects which risk-averse injurers are willing 
to undertake, particularly if insurance is compulsory.  It has been suggested that one way of 
mitigating uninsurability problems would be to legislate a liability cap on the damages an 
injurer (or their insurer) can be forced to pay in the event of an accident.  This has been used 
in several liability situations, particularly for liability for nuclear plants in the USA. 
 
Capping liability would have two effects.  First, it would reduce incentives for liable parties 
to take precautions, because they will not face full accident costs if an accident occurs.  This 
problem would be worse under strict liability, since injurers may still choose to take efficient 
precaution levels under negligence in order to avoid liability.  Second, it could expand the 
availability of insurance, by reducing insurers’ worries about being faced with large payouts, 
and by reducing the ambiguity faced by insurers about the probability distribution of payouts 
(by truncating the probability distribution of payouts at the cap). 
 
When considering the effects of capping liability, we must note that parties can enter into 
capped liability insurance contracts in private markets.  There is nothing preventing an injurer 
and insurer from entering into a contract where the injurer pays the insurer a premium, and in 
exchange the insurer will pay the cost of an accident up to some contractually fixed cap; this 
is a common practice in insurance markets.  If it is profitable to do so, then private parties 
will already use capped liability as a means of avoiding the uninsurability problem.  
Similarly, if insurers were unwilling to offer uncapped liability contracts but were willing to 
offer capped liability contracts, there is nothing preventing them from forming such contracts 
under the status quo.  Because of this, legislated capped liability will not expand the 
availability of insurance that parties can voluntarily purchase.  Instead, the impact of capping 
injurer liability would be to shift residual risk (for damages over and above the cap) from 
injurers to victims – and so would transfer wealth from victims to injurers.  This risk transfer 
could also have an undesirable effect on project selection, by making injurers more willing to 
run socially undesirable projects (because they no longer bear risk above the cap), and so 
could reduce welfare. 
 
In order for a case to be made for capped liability to increase insurance availability, there 
must be a compulsory insurance system, where parties are forced to purchase insurance that 
they would not purchase voluntarily.  If uncapped liability insurance is compulsory, but such 
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insurance is not available because of uninsurability problems, then there may be socially 
desirable GMO projects that injurers will not undertake, and so a case could be made for 
capping liability on compulsory insurance. 
 
4.9.3 Performance bonds 
A system of “performance bonds” has been suggested as another mechanism to try and 
mitigate the problem of insufficient precaution from judgement-proof injurers.  The effect of 
such a system depends on how it is implemented.  The current system of performance bonds 
used in resource management in New Zealand is actually a form of compulsory insurance, 
and the same issues apply.  In this system, firms required to pay a performance bond pay 
premiums to an underwriter, who guarantees to pay a stipulated amount (not necessarily 
equal to losses) in the event of a pre-defined accident.  This method relies on the availability 
of insurance contracts and has the same uninsurability problems as compulsory insurance, 
and acts as a ban on activities requiring a bond if insurance is unavailable.  Such a system 
will also contain moral hazard problems if the insurer cannot monitor and contract on 
precautionary behaviour. 
 
Another way of implementing performance bonds is to require a GMO applicant to actually 
post an amount of money determined by ERMA.  If this system is used, then the bond must 
eventually be returned to the applicant, or interest must be paid to the injurer on the bond.  If 
neither of these options are used, then the bond has no effect on firms’ incentives  for 
precautions, as they receive the same payoff (zero) from the bond regardless of whether or 
not an accident occurs. 
 
If the bond is to be returned, this must occur after a pre-determined period.  It is not feasible 
to return the bond “after the risk of damages is removed”, because damages from a GMO 
release may not manifest for an indefinite period, so some semi-arbitrary period which 
captures most of the risk would need to be chosen.14  To prevent investment distortions, the 
bond would need to be returned with a fair rate of return (which will be difficult to 
determine).  Alternatively, a return on the bond could be paid to the injurer each year until an 
accident occurs.  If this return was set appropriately (ie to offer a fair real return), then the 
bond requirement would not distort investment. 
 
Requiring a performance bond paid in cash does not necessarily bar injurers from spreading 
this risk elsewhere.  They may be able to borrow the up-front payment from capital markets 
using the future return of the bond as security, and make payments on this borrowing that 
would effectively act as an insurance premium.  This would have the same effect as paying 
premiums to an underwriter, the only difference being that the underwriter would pay money 
only if an accident occurs, whereas the lender would forgo the bond repayment should an 
accident occur.  These are equivalent, since a payment and a forgone gain are really the same 
thing.  In other words, a scheme requiring a cash payment from applicants where the bond is 
later returned could have the same effect as a scheme requiring an underwriter.  Effectively a 
bond would become a capital market instrument, and could be traded. 
 
If there is significant heterogeneity in the risks across projects, it may that some projects need 
a performance bond (or compulsory insurance requirement), but other low risk projects may 
                                                 
14One method would be to return the bond with interest once the intellectual property right (IPR) expires.  This 
would make some sense since once the IPR expires, the applicant is no longer able to prevent other firms from 
independently releasing the same GMO, and so it would be very difficult to prove that any damage was caused 
by the applicant.  If a semi-arbitrary date must be chosen, IPR expiration seems as good as any other. 
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not.  It may be more efficient to allow ERMA to determine which projects need a bond (and 
how much these bonds need to be 15) on a case-by-case basis, rather than having a blanket 
rule.  ERMA is likely to have better information than any other potential body (since they are 
specialised in GMO risk assessment) and can be more flexible than a legislatively dictated 
bond requirement, and may make smaller judgement errors.  While a case-by-case 
management system would have higher administrative costs than a blanket rule because each 
project would require a risk-assessment, ERMA is already required to make a risk-assessment 
when considering whether to approve a GMO release, and so many of the administrative 
costs will be incurred regardless. 
 
Though these problems are significant, they are not insurmountable.  A well-designed 
performance bond scheme would: include regulatory flexibility based on the characteristics 
of application, allow a cash payment rather than under-writing when insurance is not 
available, and return the bond with interest after some clearly fixed period of time or pay a 
fair annual return.  If these are not met, then the bond could add extra costs to GMO projects, 
and so deter investment in GMOs. 
 
The effect of such a performance bond scheme would be to increase incentives for precaution 
and guarantee the existence of some money for cleanup or compensation.  Though similar to 
a compulsory insurance scheme, the information requirements for an efficient performance 
bond scheme are higher than those for compulsory insurance, because a performance bond 
tries to mimic compulsory insurance without using market mechanisms to assess risk and set 
discount rates and prices, and so compulsory insurance may be better than performance 
bonds.  However, if there are major uninsurability problems, a performance bond system 
could be better than compulsory insurance, because it may have a smaller impact on deterring 
investment. 
 
4.9.4 Catastrophe bonds 
If the problem behind uninsurability is the size of payments rather than ambiguity, then 
alternative financial mechanisms could mitigate the problem.  Some Commission submitters 
propose the use of a “catastrophe bond”, a financial instrument designed to help spread the 
risk for accidents that inflict very high damage.  Under a catastrophe bond, a party facing 
some very large potential liability (such as an earthquake) issues a bond that pays its face 
value at the maturity date unless a specifically defined accident occurs (such as an earthquake 
of at least a particular Richter scale rating in a particular area).  Financial markets thus value 
the bond based on their expectations about the probability of the accident occurring. 
 
The advantage of catastrophe bonds is that they draw from capital markets, which are deeper 
and have more capital available than insurers and reinsurance markets, and are more able to 
deal with very large losses. 
 
However, catastrophe bonds face several problems.  First, there can be difficulties in 
contractually specifying the window in which the bond does not pay off.  This could be 
difficult to define for a GMO accident.  Second, there may be a moral hazard problem, and 
this could be worse than for insurance, since bond-owners would be less able to monitor 
                                                 
15 Inherent in any performance bond system is the difficulty in selecting the appropriate level of the bond.  If the 
bond is set too high, then this will deter desirable investment, and if the bond is set too low, then the injurer may 
still take insufficient precaution because of limited liability. 
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precautions than insurers.  Catastrophe bonds are best suited to circumstances such as natural 
disasters, where there is no ability to take precautions against the accident occurring16. 
 
Third, there has been little investor interest in catastrophe bonds thus far.  Bantwal & 
Kunreuther (2000) propose several reasons for this.  First, investors are unfamiliar with a new 
type of asset.  Second, investment managers face strong personal incentives to avoid big 
losses (which catastrophe bonds would yield should an accident occur), particularly on new 
and unfamiliar asset types.  Finally, investors may be ambiguity averse, in the same manner 
as insurers.  Investors are unwilling in invest in assets where they do not have a good idea of 
the probability distribution of payoffs, and so do not know how to price the asset.  Investors 
may also have less information about the probability distribution of accidents than insurers, 
who might be in a better position to acquire specialist expertise in GMO risk assessment.  
This is a major problem for using catastrophe bonds for GMOs. 
 
Thus, catastrophe bonds may be able to mitigate the problem of large losses from accidents, 
but not the potentially more important problem of ambiguity aversion.  The moral hazard 
problem they create may also be serious, if there are precautions that can be taken to reduce 
the probability of high-damage accidents. 
 
4.9.5 Public compensation scheme 
Another option available is a socialisation of the risk of GMO release by creating a public 
compensation system, similar to ACC, whereby government compensates victims of GMO 
accidents.  Such a scheme may be attractive if there are few foreseeable precautions that can 
be taken, if legal costs are very high relative to the level of harm involved, or in conjunction 
with a negligence liability system that does not compensate victims.  This could either be 
funded from general taxation, or through an industry fund, such as that discussed below.  The 
main advantage of a socialised scheme is to achieve equity/compensation goals with lower 
administration costs than those of a liability system.  However, such a scheme will not 
provide incentives for precaution, and so another instrument is needed to provide these 
incentives (such as negligence liability). 
 
4.9.6 Industry fund 
Another suggestion has been the formation of a fund to which industry members contribute as 
a dedicated compensation fund.  Industry members would make some annual contribution to 
the fund, which may change over time depending on the number of accidents that occur.  The 
effects of the fund would depend on what the fund was used for: accident cleanup, victim 
compensation, or paying legal fees for victims to sue injurers. 
 
Such a fund would have some initial setup problems.  Industry members would need to be 
clearly defined, an aggregate funding level would need to be determined, a mechanism for 
determining how this should change given the number of accidents and entry and exit of 
firms, and a fair and efficient system of dividing the burden of this funding between 
contributors.  However, these problems are not insoluble. 
 
                                                 
16 These problems occur only for precautions that change the probability of the accident, since the benefits of 
such precautions go to bondholders, not to the parties liable for accident costs.  In contrast, there is no moral 
hazard problem for precautions that merely reduce the cost of the accident when it occurs, such as strengthening 
buildings, since the benefits of these precautions go to the parties liable for accident costs, not the purchasers or 
the bond. 
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The more serious problem with such a fund is that it provides very little incentive for 
individual firms to take precaution.  There is a free-rider problem where the costs of investing 
in precaution are borne by each individual firm, but the costs of an accident is borne by the 
fund and so the industry as a whole.  The only solution to this is to ensure that individual 
firms are still held liable for their own damages, even if the fund is initially used as a source 
of compensation.  Efficiency could also be improved by experience-rating contributions of 
industry members, so firms that have had accidents pay larger contributions in future.  This 
will have little impact if there are few accidents, or if accidents that occur are large enough to 
bankrupt the firm liable for them.  Similarly, contributions could be based on estimates of the 
risks of particular projects. 
 
If the fund provides compensation to victims, then there will be less incentive for injured 
parties to take legal action, and so fewer lawsuits and less incentive for precaution.  If this 
compensation is equal to the level of damage suffered, then victims will also face little 
incentive to take their own precautions. 
 
If the fund is used to pay the legal costs of alleged victims, then it could make injurers more 
fearful of liability and so prevent insufficient precaution, but could also lead to frivolous and 
unnecessary lawsuits, as opponents of GMOs take unjustified lawsuits in the hope of winning 
a case or settlement from a GM firm, or of raising GM costs. 
 
A compensation fund should only be set up in place of liability if it is believed that there are 
few effective precautions that can be taken by either injurers or victims, or if victim 
compensation is a high priority and alternatives such as liability are ineffective (such as if the 
problem of identifying who caused an accident is insurmountable). 
 
The commonly cited example of such a fund is the USA’s Superfund, funded both by 
industry contributions and federal taxes.  The main goal of Superfund was to provide liquid 
assets to be used to fund cleanup operations of chemical spills and toxic waste sites, since 
lawsuits and appeals may take years to provide funds to victims.  Such a goal may not be 
readily applicable to GMOs – it is unclear how much “cleanup” would be possible from a 
GMO accident.  It may also be inefficient in some cases for cleanup if the costs of cleanup 
are more than the reduction of damage from cleanup – and given that the benefits of the 
cleanup will not be borne by the party making the decision over whether to fund the cleanup, 
there will be imperfect incentives for this decision.  Superfund was also designed to work in 
conjunction with a tort litigation system, where lawsuits against individual would still be 
pursued. 
 
Superfund has been heavily criticised as having very high transaction and legal costs.  The 
Commission notes there have been claims that Superfund has resulted in “lengthy and 
expensive litigation, delays and inefficiency in clean ups, waste and even fraud; there are 
claims that 36 to 60 cents of every dollar put into Superfund has gone in legal and other 
transaction costs.” (Eichelbaum 2001, p324 para 65). 
 
4.10 Other issues 
There are some other issues that should also be considered when designing a liability regime 
for GMOs, that are unique to GMOs in New Zealand. 
 
4.10.1 Case-by-case analysis 
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Some parties have suggested that ERMA should have the ability to make decisions on a case-
by-case basis rather than have general legislative or regulatory rules.  While it is unlikely to 
be feasible to micromanage precautions through command-and-control decisions by a 
regulator (particularly if firms have better information about their proposals than ERMA), 
there are likely to be gains from providing flexibility for ERMA to set some specific release 
conditions or requirements for performance bonds and compulsory insurance. 
 
Given that requiring compulsory insurance has costs and benefits and that these will vary 
between project proposals, a blanket rule describing activities where these instruments are 
required will likely mean that there are projects where the benefits from requiring these 
instruments outweigh the costs but they are not required under the rule, or projects where the 
costs outweigh the benefits but are required by the blanket rule.  Allowing case-by-case 
management may reduce this problem, and would allow ERMA to only require bonds in 
cases where there is a high risk of default.  If firms know that they will be required to pay 
performance bonds if they try and avoid liability by operating GMO activities through low-
asset subsidiaries, then this may reduce incentives to operate through such subsidiaries.   
 
The trade-off of case-by-case management of requirements for compulsory insurance or 
performance bonds is that this will have higher administration costs than a blanket rule. 
 
4.10.2 International issues 
At their core, most of the above arguments on determining the optimal liability regime 
assume that equal weight is placed on injurer and victim benefits in the cost/benefit analysis, 
regardless of whether they have foreign or New Zealand owners.  An argument could be 
made that such analysis should place a smaller weight on (or ignore) profits to foreign firms 
because these profits do not directly benefit New Zealanders, while most risks and costs of 
GMOs will fall on New Zealanders.  However, there are several problems with treating 
foreign profits/costs as less important than domestic profits/costs.  First, this could create 
undesirable investment and price distortions.  It could limit the ability of domestic 
biotechnology firms to secure foreign investment to expand their operations, and could 
increase prices to New Zealand consumers.  Second, such a move could be seen as a non-
tariff trade barrier.  This could cause other countries to reciprocate with other trade barriers or 
to take action against New Zealand through the WTO, and could also weaken New Zealand’s 
attempts to get other countries to lower their trade barriers to New Zealand exports and 
jeopardise the possibility of free trade deals.  Finally, it may be impractical for regulators to 
undertake such analyses.  Consider for example if a domestic firm applies for and receives 
consent to release a GMO – would a regulatory system that treated foreign firms differently 
from domestic ones then prevent the domestic firm from merging with or being purchased by 
a foreign firm, or from trading its intellectual property right on the GMO to a foreign firm? 
 
Another concern raised by some people is that New Zealand could be used as a “testing 
ground” for risky GMOs by multinational firms.  Such firms could have incentives to 
undertake risky GMO projects in New Zealand that are not profitable (or socially desirable 
for New Zealand) as standalone projects, in order to gain more information for future release 
elsewhere.  New Zealand would be a desirable place to undertake such projects because its 
geographic isolation means that accidents could be contained, and so accident costs would be 
lower than release elsewhere.  If this concern is valid, then this supports use of strict liability 
and performance bond requirements for such projects, as these provide stronger incentives for 
firms to refrain from undertaking overly risky projects. 
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4.10.3 What about the future? 
A final issue is that the design of a liability regime must not only be appropriate in present 
circumstances, but should be flexible enough to handle future changes with minimal cost.  
While there is little information now about many aspects of GMOs, this is likely to change 
over coming years as more research is undertaken.  It may be that more information about 
risks is discovered and this reduction in ambiguity means that insurance agents become more 
willing to provide liability insurance.  It may be that there are changes in the costs or benefits 
of use of GMOs because of changes in consumer demand in favour of organic or GM foods.  
It may be that there is new information about the types and effectiveness of precautions.  
These changes may mean that a different liability regime would become optimal.  This 
suggests that some discretion should be left to regulatory authorities and courts rather than 
stipulated in legislation, as it is easier for regulators to change policy or courts to discover or 
set new law than to go through the long process of legislative reform. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This paper has presented an outline of the issues that will determine the best liability regime 
for GMOs.  While possibly offering large benefits, genetically modified organisms may cause 
accidents that inflict costs on third parties, through personal injury, economic loss or 
environmental damage.  If GMOs do not cause such accidents, then the choice of liability 
system is unimportant.  However, if GMOs can cause accidents, then in the absence of any 
liability system, injurers will take insufficient precaution to reduce the risk of such accidents.  
Different liability systems could lead to different outcomes, so the optimal liability system 
will be the one that leads to the best institutional structure should GMOs turn out to cause 
accidents.  So, what is the best liability system? 
 
While there are many other hazardous activities, there is considerable controversy over what 
lessons can be drawn from the experiences of liability for these activities, and over the degree 
of similarity between GMOs and such activities.  This motivates a separate examination for 
the optimal liability regime for GMOs. 
 
A range of issues that must be considered when designing a liability regime.  The question of 
negligence vs. strict liability is central to the design of a liability regime, and the answer to 
this question lies in providing incentives for firms to take efficient precaution and activity 
levels.  While liability systems may be able to provide incentives for parties to take efficient 
precaution, they are not able to also provide incentives for firms to only undertake socially 
desirable projects.  Even with the presence of a regulator, there are a range of factors (such as 
asymmetric information, the sunk nature of research costs, and regulator bias) that suggest 
that strict liability will generally perform better than negligence. 
 
The two main problems with strict liability are if GMO projects have large positive 
externalities (in which case strict liability could deter desirable GMO activity), or if there is 
the potential for large accidents to occur that deal more damage than the assets of the liable 
firm (in which case firms will have insufficient incentive for precaution).  There are a range 
of instruments which might help mitigate this problem (such as compulsory insurance, 
performance bonds or catastrophe bonds), but each has weaknesses which would make any 
solution imperfect. 
 
While this analysis has focused on issues raised in the New Zealand liability debate, many of 
the issues raised are broadly applicable to GMO management in other countries or to other 
potentially hazardous activities. 
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